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Abstract
This study investigates whether audit partner gender is associated with the extent of auditor disclosure and the communica-
tion style regarding risks of material misstatements that are classified as key audit matters (KAMs). Using a sample of UK 
firms during the 2013–2017 period, our results suggest that female audit partners are more likely than male audit partners to 
disclose more KAMs with more details after controlling for both client and audit firm attributes. Furthermore, female audit 
partners are found to use a less optimistic tone and provide less readable audit reports, compared to their male counterparts, 
suggesting that behavioural variances between female and male audit partners may have significant implications on their 
writing style. Therefore, this study offers new insights on the role of audit partner gender in extended audit reporting. Our 
findings have important implications for audit firms, investors, policymakers and governments in relation to the development, 
implementation and enforcement of gender diversity.
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Introduction
This study investigates how audit partner gender could influ-
ence the extent of auditor disclosure and the communication 
style regarding risks that are classified as key audit matters 
(KAMs).1 The behavioural differences between males and 
females have been extensively examined in the business eth-
ics literature (Carmona et al. 2018; Kelan 2008; Qi et al. 
2018). Gender-related studies in the accounting and audit-
ing profession suggest that women tend to be more risk-
averse and acting more ethically, but other studies found 
no behavioural differences between genders in high-profile 
jobs and leadership positions (Elmagrhi et al. 2019; Lara 
et al. 2017; Ntim 2015; Sila et al. 2016; Zalata et al. 2019). 
Despite inconsistent pieces of evidence, the existing research 
on gender behavioural differences appears tilted in favour 
of the positive implications of gender diversity for auditing 
and financial reporting quality (Qi et al. 2018; Zalata et al. 
2019). In this study, we postulate that behavioural variances 
between female and male in risk aversion may have sig-
nificant implications for audit reporting, especially after the 
recent reforms.
The consequences of the financial crisis included a press-
ing need to disclose more client and audit-specific informa-
tion (PCAOB 2016). New regulations and practices followed, 
including a move towards much more detailed audit reports. 
The UK mandated extended audit reports (EARs)2 in 2013. 
KAMs are essential to EARs, and auditors must use their 
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1 IAASB uses key audit matters (KAMs) and PCAOB uses critical 
auditor matters (CAMs) effective from June 30, 2019 for large accel-
erated filers and December 15, 2020 for other companies. FRC started 
with risks of material misstatements (RMMs) in 2013 and then 
KAMs from 2016. According to FRC, KAMs are broadly equivalent 
to the (RMMs).
2 The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Boards 
(IAASB) issued its standards for EARs in 2015 (effective date of 
December 15, 2016); the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) issued its standard for EARs in 2017 (effective date 
of December 15, 2017).
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own professional judgement and draw on personal qualities 
to identify and discuss these with their clients before deciding 
which ones to include in their EARs. This change exposes 
auditors to greater accountability and tempts legitimacy 
issues that may affect their reputation (Brasel et al. 2016; 
Gimbar et al. 2016; Kachelmeier et al. 2014). In response, 
audit firms may change their norms and working patterns 
(Kharuddin and Basioudis 2018; Srinidhi and Gul 2007). 
However, such increased demand on auditors has not yet 
brought commensurate concern for individual practitioners 
and their characteristics. The increasing diversity of practi-
tioners means such personal characteristics need the under-
standing to improve processes and results. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, no attempt has been made to explore the 
impact of auditors’ personal characteristics on EAR.
Given the substantial auditing regulatory change, a num-
ber of concurrent emerging studies has investigated the deter-
minants and consequences of the EAR. Specifically, a small 
strand of literature has grown that investigates how EAR could 
affect audit quality, audit fees and financial reporting quality 
(Gutierrez et al. 2018; Lennox et al. 2019; Reid et al. 2019; 
Sierra-Garcia et al. 2019). Sierra-Garcia et al. (2019) find that 
the auditor’s attributes are among the factors that affect the 
number and type of the disclosed KAMs. This is supported by 
a strand of literature that shifts the focus from audit firm level 
to partner level as partners have different behavioural char-
acteristics (Lennox and Wu 2018). Auditors’ determination 
of KAMs often varies among audit partners, and understand-
ably so given that individual characteristics influence audi-
tors’ own professional judgements (Jermakowicz et al. 2018). 
Female auditors are more risk-averse (Hardies et al. 2013), 
less overconfident (Lee et al. 2019; Ittonen and Peni 2012) and 
have different negotiation skills (Hardies et al. 2015). On the 
audit reporting model, gender behavioural differences might 
influence auditors’ language, wording, and reporting style in 
EARs, but when female and male audit partners behave simi-
larly in high-profile jobs then gender might have no effect on 
audit reporting or its communicative value. This study adds to 
this nascent research by examining auditor gender influence 
on the extent of disclosure and communication style regarding 
risks classified as KAMs in EARs.
Our study is motivated by increasing gender diversity in the 
business environment in general and the accounting profession 
in particular. Indeed, the percentage of female principals at the 
largest five UK audit firms has increased in recent years (FRC 
2018). The UK offers an ideal setting for empirical research on 
auditor gender and audit reporting, given its early adoption of 
EARs and partner signature requirement (Carcello and Li 2013). 
Using a sample of UK listed firms over the period 2013–2017, 
we find that female audit partners tend to perceive more risks and 
thus disclose more KAMs and provide more detailed information 
about KAMs than male auditors do. On reporting style, we find 
female audit partners tend to deliver less readable reports than 
their male counterparts, and they do so in a less optimistic tone. 
We conduct several robustness checks to address endogeneity 
concerns and our results remain qualitatively unchanged, sug-
gesting that the behavioural variances between female and male 
audit partners influence audit reporting.
The study contributes to the literature by providing new 
insights into the way partners behave. Specifically, it offers 
empirical evidence for gender influences on audit processes, 
communications, and reports. Our study extends the work of 
Breesch and Branson (2009) and Sierra-Garcia et al. (2019) 
by investigating gender differences using a large sample of real 
audit reports from the UK audit market. It thus responds to 
calls for more research on how auditor characteristics influence 
audit reporting decisions (Church et al. 2008) and on whether 
gender differences exist within highly professionalized auditor 
groups (Hardies et al. 2015; Bédard et al. 2019). It does simi-
lar for calls regarding audit-related readability studies (Fisher 
et al. 2016), as it provides initial research on the relationship 
gender has with linguistic style, readability, and tone of audit 
reports. Finally, this research explores current professional, 
academic, and political contentions regarding women’s under-
representation in organizations’ senior management positions, 
especially in audit firms that face allegations of gender dis-
crimination (Lennox and Wu 2018; Nasution and Jonnergård 
2017; Dalton et al. 2014). It contributes to continuing drives 
for minimizing gender inequality regarding representation but 
also such inequality at more personal levels (e.g. providing 
different views from traditionally male-dominated processes 
and procedures). Overall, then, this study has implications for 
the recent auditing standards that mandated KAMs and EARs 
and for business ethics. It educates audit firms on potential 
variations in audit reporting between female and male audi-
tors, helping them with auditor choice, audit training, and audit 
planning. It also helps regulators assess audit reform and the 
regulatory changes in audit reporting. Furthermore, this work 
appeals to investors, market participants, and academics who 
are concerned about the new audit reporting model.
The study is organized as follows. “Extant Literature and 
Hypotheses Development” section presents the extant empiri-
cal literature and develops the research hypotheses. “Research 
Method” section outlines the research design, and “Results and 
Discussion” section discusses the empirical findings. “Conclu-
sion” section concludes this research.
Extant Literature and Hypotheses 
Development
Auditor Gender and KAMs Disclosure
Gender differences exist in financial reporting, risk man-
agement and auditing (e.g. Francoeur et al. 2019; Garcia-
Blandon et al. 2019; Zalata et al. 2019). For instance, 
Female Audit Partners and Extended Audit Reporting: UK Evidence 
1 3
women are more sensitive to risk, they perceive more 
risks, participate in less risky behaviour, and make less 
risky choices (Ho et al. 2015; Francis et al. 2015; Jiana-
koplos and Bernasek 2007). Prior studies provide evi-
dence for female auditors being more risk-averse (Har-
dies et al. 2013; Ittonen et al. 2013; Nekhili et al. 2018) 
and more liable to personal conflicts of interest (Alder-
man 2017). Furthermore, female auditors detect more 
possible material misstatements (Breesch and Branson 
2009) and more likely issue going concern opinion (Har-
dies et al. 2016).
Additionally, female auditors are less overconfident 
(Ittonen and Peni 2012) compared with their male counter-
parts, who may underestimate audit engagement risks and 
fail to assess their clients properly (Garcia-Blandon et al. 
2019; Nekhili et al. 2018; Hardies et al. 2015; Owhoso 
and Weickgenannt 2009). Female auditors are also more 
effective in information processing (Chung and Monroe 
2001) and audit judgements (O’Donnell and Johnson 
2001). They tend to comply more with rules and regula-
tions, have higher levels of moral reasoning, and are more 
ethical (Karjalainen et al. 2018).
Gender discrimination is another explanation for female 
auditors’ behaviour. Some studies link the effect of auditor 
gender on audit outcomes to gender discrimination in audit 
firms (Lee et al. 2019; Lennox and Wu 2018; Dalton et al. 
2014). Female auditors must have higher skills and con-
duct extra effort to reach leading positions (Nasution and 
Jonnergård 2017). Female auditors tend to overestimate 
their responsibilities and take decisions that may affect 
their tasks’ scope and performance (Fondas and Sassa-
los 2000; Ittonen et al. 2013), which often means they 
work very hard and assign more resources to audit tasks. 
More generally, auditors may use KAMs disclosure to 
minimize their legal liability and to symbolize their effort 
(Kachelmeier et al. 2014; CFA Institute 2013; Vanstraelen 
et al. 2012).
Many researchers clearly indicate gender differences, 
with the implication being different reactions to new 
KAMs requirements will result between genders, yet pre-
vious research has neglected this. Thus, we expect that 
female audit partners are likely to identify more KAMs 
and report them in greater detail. Considering these gender 
differences in the literature and pursuing a further under-
standing of women auditors in relation to this works’ aims 
leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a Female audit partners report more KAMs 
than male audit partners do.
Hypothesis 1b Female audit partners disclose the reported 
KAMs in greater detail than male audit partners do.
Auditor Gender and Writing Style
Debates on gender differences in language styles have per-
meated psychological, linguistics, communications, and 
feminist studies (Leaper and Ayres 2007; Leaper and Rob-
nett 2011), with women being more likely to adopt a subjec-
tive and evaluative explanatory mode. They also approach 
their interpretations more creatively (Breesch and Branson 
2009), which fits the socioemotional role (Wood 1966), and 
they use supporting language strategies that imply involve-
ment rather than males’ provocative language strategies 
(Breesch and Branson 2009). These language variances 
increase with fewer limitations on language use (Newman 
et al. 2008).
Males and females also have differing semantic purposes 
when creating sentences, as women’s writings use more 
uncertainty verb phrases (Newman et al. 2008; Mulac and 
Lundell 1994), though some studies nevertheless find men 
and women use language similarly (e.g. Thomson and Mura-
chver 2001).
Effective writing relates to tone (Jones 2011), though 
business managers use different tones in different disclosure 
practices (Huang et al. 2013) and for various purposes – for 
example, Rogers et al. (2011) suggest optimistic language 
tempts greater litigation risk. Managers thus often use an 
optimistic tone when litigation risk is low and when they 
have greater strategic reporting incentives (Davis and Tama-
Sweet 2012), though García-Sánchez et al. (2019) found 
female directors lowering their optimistic tone in sustain-
ability reporting to increase their credibility. As audit part-
ners are personally accountable for audit reports and audi-
tor signatures have been mandated (Garcia-Blandon et al. 
2019), the implication is that women’s risk-averse attitude, 
conservatism, and overestimation of responsibilities suggest 
they use less optimistic language in EARs (a proposal risk 
aversion theory supports), but this needs exploring. As such, 
hypothesis 2a is as follows:
Hypothesis 2a Female audit partners use a less optimistic 
tone in EAR than their male counterparts.
Smith and Smith (1971) propose readability as a meas-
ure of the communication process in financial reports, and 
Barnett and Leoffler (1979) note variations regarding audit 
report readability levels. Hay (1998) similarly reported sig-
nificant readability variances from different New Zealand 
audit firms. Linsley and Lawrence (2007) deem the larg-
est UK companies’ risk reporting very difficult to read and 
argue that disclosing more risk information will not improve 
communication if it is less readable.
Recent changes in audit reporting have increased techni-
cal expressions and resulted in lengthy audit reports, despite 
lengthy reports negatively affecting readability (Bonsall and 
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Miller 2017; Loughran and McDonald 2014; You and Zhang 
2009). On how KAMs disclosures influence audit report 
readability, Smith (2019) says these have improved readabil-
ity in the UK market, while Carver and Trinkle (2017) note 
negative effects. On gender, for Ginesti et al. (2018) the pres-
ence of female directors positively influences annual reports’ 
readability in companies with small boardroom connections. 
Fisher et al.’s (2016) call for more research on audit-related 
readability seems logical given such mixed evidence overall, 
and this work more specifically analyses gender and EAR 
readability. Our final hypothesis is thus as follows:
Hypothesis 2b There is a significant relationship between 
audit partners’ gender and EAR readability.
Research Method
Sample and Data Collection
Our sample begins with all non-financial UK companies 
listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) FTSE ALL 
Shares index over five years from 2013 to 2017. This period 
follows the UK’s implementation of the EAR and thus man-
dated auditor disclosure of KAMs, effective from the fiscal 
year ending on/or after September 2013. Two data types 
derive from three different sources: financial information 
from Datastream and FAME databases; and auditor-related 
variables (including EAR data) from companies’ annual 
reports. The initial sample was 364 FTSE listed compa-
nies with 1820 firm-year observations before imposing any 
screens. After removing companies with missing data, the 
final sample totalled 312 non-financial companies with 1373 
firm-year observations. Panel A of Table 1 gives details of 
the sample selection procedures; Panel B shows the indus-
trial breakdown of the final sample based on ICB codes.
Research Model Specification for H1
The first pair of hypotheses examines the association 
between audit partner gender and the volume of KAMs dis-
closure. H1a predicts a positive relationship between female 
audit partners and number of KAMs disclosed. To test H1a, 
we first employ Model 1 to link the number of KAMs to 
audit partner gender and other auditor and firm-related 
determinants.
Consistent with recent EAR studies (Bédard et al. 2019; 
Lennox et al. 2019; Sierra-Garcia et al. 2019), the depend-
ent variable in Model 1, KAM, is the natural log of the total 
number of risks disclosed in the KAM section of the audit 
report for firm i during year t.3 The main independent vari-
able of interest is GENDER, a dummy variable that equals 1 
if a female audit partner audits the company and 0 otherwise. 
(1)
KAMit = 훽0 + 훽1GENDERit + 훽2RISKit + 훽3ACCRUALSit
+ 훽
4
GCOit + 훽5AFEESit + 훽6NAFEESit + 훽7SWITCHit
+ 훽
8
SIZEit + 훽9ROAit + 훽10QUICKit + 훽11LOSSit
+ 훽
12
DEBTit + 훽13SEGMENTSit
+ YearFixed Effects+Industry Fixed Effects
+ Audit Firm Fixed Effects + 휀it
Table 1  Sample selection and distribution by industry
Panel A—Sample selection procedures Firms Observations
UK non-financial firms listed in FTSE ALL Shares index 364 1820
(−) Observations without EAR & other auditing data 275
(−) Observations with missing control variables 172
Total observations 312 1373
Panel B—Sample distribution by industry No. of observations %
Basic materials 134 9.76
Consumer goods 160 11.65
Consumer services 357 26
Health care 65 4.73
Industrials 463 33.72
Oil and gas 73 5.32
Technology 65 4.73
Telecommunications 26 1.89
Utilities 30 2.18
Total 1373 100
3 We used log KAMs plus one to consider cases with one KAM only.
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We collected auditor names from annual reports4 then we 
searched for them on the audit firm website or LinkedIn to 
identify his/her gender. H1a would be empirically supported 
if the coefficient on GENDER in Model 1 is significant and 
positive.
Model 1 also uses a range of control variables commonly 
used in auditing literature and EAR studies to capture other 
auditor and firm-related characteristics (e.g. Bédard et al. 
2019; Gutierrez et al. 2018; Sierra-Garcia et al. 2019). Firm-
related variables include firm size (SIZE), firm risk (RISK), 
return on assets (ROA), quick asset ratio (QUICK), ratio of 
debt to total assets (DEBT), presence of a net loss in the 
current year (LOSS), and complexity (SEGMENTS). Extant 
research deems larger, leveraged, and loss-making firms 
more incentivized to engage in more aggressive financial 
reporting and to likely have more KAMs (Pinto and Morais 
2019; Sierra-Garcia et al. 2019). Firm risk (RISK) prox-
ies for the firm’s operating and business risk environment; 
number of business segments (SEGMENTS) proxies for 
the firm’s operating complexity; and discretionary accru-
als (ACC RUA LS) proxy for firm’s earning management 
practices.
Following Pinto and Morais (2019), Gutierrez et al. (2018) 
and Sierra-Garcia et al. (2019), we control for auditor-related 
variables, which include going concern opinion (GCO), audit 
fees (AFEES), non-audit service fees (NAFEES), and audi-
tor switch (SWITCH). Detailed descriptions of all variables 
are presented in Table 2. We also control for year, industry, 
and audit firm fixed effects to attenuate the concern that our 
findings are affected by time-invariant year, industry, or audit 
firm characteristics.5 It is important to control for audit firm 
fixed effects to alleviate the concern that audit partners pro-
vide a similar level of KAMs across the audit firm as a whole 
regardless of audit partner gender.
The influence of auditor gender on the KAMs disclo-
sure also evidences in the length of the auditor disclosure, 
reflecting the detail provided. H1b says female audit partners 
disclose reported KAMs in great detail. To test H1b, Model 
2 tests the relationship between the length of KAM disclo-
sure with audit partner gender, controlling for the number of 
KAMs and the other auditor and firm-related determinants 
used in Model 1.
In Model 2, the dependent variable is the length of KAM 
disclosure (LENGTH), measured by the natural logarithm of 
number of words in the auditor’s disclosure of KAMs (De 
Franco et al. 2015; Twedt and Rees 2012). Similar to Model 
1, the main independent variable of interest is audit partner 
gender. In Model 2, H1b would be empirically supported if 
the coefficient on GENDER is significant and positive.
Research Model Specification for H2
H2 tests the association between gender and writing style by 
examining the tone (H2a) and readability (H2b) of the audit 
report. H2a predicts a negative relationship between female 
audit partners and the use of an optimistic tone in EARs. To 
test H2a, Model 3 links EAR tone to audit partner gender 
and other auditor and firm-related characteristics.
In Model 3, the dependent variable is the auditor report tone 
(TONE). TONE captures the degree of auditor optimism 
(auditor’s sentiment) in the audit report. Its calculation is 
based on the frequency of positive and negative words (iden-
tified according to Loughran and McDonald’s (2011)6 word 
dictionaries). Following Henry and Leone (2016) and El-Haj 
et al. (2019a, b), TONE is as follows:
(2)
LENGTH it = 훽0 + 훽1GENDERit + 훽2KAMit + 훽3RISKit
+ 훽
4
ACCRUALSit + 훽5GCOit + 훽6AFEESit
+ 훽
7
NAFEESit + 훽8SWITCHit + 훽9SIZEit
+ 훽
10
ROAit + 훽11QUICKit + 훽12LOSSit
+ 훽
13
DEBTit + 훽14SEGMENTSit
+ Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects
+ Audit Firm Fixed Effects + 휀it
(3)
TONEit = 훽0 + 훽1GENDERit + 훽2KAMit + 훽3RISKit
+ 훽
4
ACCRUALSit + 훽5GCOit + 훽6AC_TONEit
+ 훽
7
AFEESit + 훽8NAFEESit + 훽9SWITCHit
+ 훽
10
SIZEit + 훽11ROAit + 훽12QUICKit + 훽13LOSSit
+ 훽
14
DEBTit + 훽15SEGMENTSit
+ Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects
+ Audit Firm Fixed Effects + 휀it4 The UK mandated audit partners signature since 2009 (Carcello 
and Li 2013).
5 We do not account for the firm fixed effect, since the independent 
variable of interest (i.e. gender) is a dummy variable and do not sub-
stantially vary within firms over the study period. Thus, we believe 
that firm fixed effect is not suitable for our dataset. Also, Lennox 
and Wu (2018) highlighted the methodology of Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) and Gul et  al. (2013) that “To qualify for inclusion in their 
sample, a partner has to meet two conditions: (1) the partner audited 
at least two clients (to enable the separate estimation of partner fixed 
effects and client fixed effects), and (2) the partner audited a client 
for at least 3 years and there are at least another three years in which 
the partner audits a different client. Thus, each partner in their sample 
has a minimum of six observations and two clients (pp. 10 and 13)”. 
Actually, these conditions are not met in our sample because EAR 
was adopted recently in 2013 and our sample covers 5 years only. We 
acknowledge this as a limitation of the study.
6 We employed the Corporate Financial Information Environment 
(CFIE) Final Report Structure Extractor (FRSE) (hereafter CFIE-
FRSE), a tool developed by El-Haj et al. (2019a, b), to calculate the 
word frequency of positive and negative words.
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Model 3’s main independent variable is audit partner gen-
der (GENDER) and H2a would be empirically supported 
if the GENDER coefficient is significant and negative. The 
study employs various control variables commonly used in 
previous studies to capture auditor and firm-related char-
acteristics. Following Smith (2019), we control for firm 
size in the auditor tone model. Larger firms are prestigious 
clients with stronger bargaining power over their auditors 
(Casterella et al. 2004; Fernando et al. 2010). Additionally, 
Toneit =
No. of positive words − No. of negative words
Total of positive and negative words
they have higher information quality (Atiase 1985; Lee and 
Park 2019), and higher analyst following (Christensen et al. 
2004). We also control for other firm characteristics included 
in Models 1 and 2 as they affect the auditor work and can 
be reflected in the auditor report tone. Davis et al. (2015) 
suggest including firm performance variables to capture 
the effects of current performance on reporting tone, with 
(ROA) capturing profitability during the current period, and 
QUICK and LOSS convey information about liquidity (Hayn 
1995). Other literature (e.g. Cao et al. 2012; Lee and Park 
2019; McGuire et al. 2012; Patelli and Pedrini 2015; Smith 
2019; Veenman et al. 2011) indicates that larger, leveraged, 
Table 2  Summary of definitions and operationalization of variables
Variable Definitions and coding
Panel A: dependent variables
 KAM Natural logarithm of the number of key audit matters disclosed in audit report plus one for firm i in year t
 LENGTH Length of Auditor’s Disclosure, which is measured by taking the natural logarithm of words number in auditor 
disclosure of KAMs for firm i in year t
 TONE Tone of the auditor report computed using the following equation: (Positivity Freq − Negativity Freq)/(Positivity 
Freq + Negativity Freq) (Automated content analysis − Auditor report)
 READABILITY Readability of the auditor report measured by the fog index. The fog index score is computed using this formula:
Fog = 0.4 × (average sentence length + percentage of complex words). This index indicates that higher score 
mean text is harder to read (Automated content analysis − Auditor report)
Main independent variable
 GENDER A dummy variable equals 1 if the auditor report is signed by a female audit partner and 0 otherwise
Control variables
 RISK Firm risk proxied by price volatility measured by a stock’s average annual price movement to a high and low 
from a mean price for each year. For example, a stock’s price volatility of 20% indicates that the stock’s annual 
high and low price has shown a historical variation of + 20% to − 20% from its annual average price (Data-
stream: Price Volatility (WC08806))
 ACC RUA LS The absolute value of abnormal discretionary accruals using the performance-matched discretionary accruals of 
Kothari et al. (2005) (All variables used in this measure are collected from Datastream)
 GCO 1 if the auditor issues a going concern decision for firm i in year t , 0 otherwise. (FAME)
 AFEES Audit fees measured by the natural logarithm of total audit fees for firm i in year t. (FAME)
 NAFEES Measured by the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (FAME)
 AC_TONE Tone of the audit committee’s report computed using the following equation: (Positivity Freq − Negativity Freq)/
(Positivity Freq + Negativity Freq). (Automated content analysis − Audit committee report)
 AC_READABILITY Readability of the audit committee’s report, which is measured by the Fog index. The fog index score is com-
puted using this formula: Fog = 0.4 × (average sentence length + percentage of complex words). This Index 
indicates that higher score mean text is harder to read (Automated content analysis − Audit committee report)
 SWITCH 1 if the audit partner is changed for firm i in year t, 0 otherwise (Annual report)
 SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t (Datastream: WC02999)
 ROA EBIT /total assets for firm i in year t (Datastream: WC01250/WC02999)
 QUICK The ratio of current assets less inventories to current liabilities for firm i in year t (Datastream: (WC02201-
WC02101)/ WC03101)
 DEBT DEBT is the ratio of total debt to total assets for firm i in year t. (Datastream: WC03255/WC02999)
 LOSS 1 if firm i has negative income in year t, 0 otherwise (Datastream: WC01751)
 SEGMENTS Complexity measured by number of firm segments. (Annual report)
 FEMALE_AC Ratio of female audit committee members to audit committee size for firm i in year t (Annual report)
 INDUSTRY Industry fixed effects based on the ICB
 YEAR Year fixed effects
 AUDITOR Audit firm fixed effects
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and loss-making firms are more likely to engage in more 
aggressive financial reporting and consequently receive a 
negative audit tone. Model 3 includes firm risk (RISK) to 
proxy for firms’ operating and business risk environment, 
number of business segments (SEGMENTS) to proxy for 
their operating complexity, and discretionary accruals (ACC 
RUA LS) to proxy for firms’ earning management practices. 
Additionally, we control for audit committee tone (AC_
TONE) in Eq. (3) to capture the impact of audit committee 
communication with the auditor on EAR tone. Based on 
the UK corporate governance code and auditing standards 
requirements, audit committees are responsible for oversee-
ing the relationship with external auditors who are required 
to communicate relevant information to the audit committee 
in order to help them understand the rationale of auditors’ 
professional judgement.
To help dismiss concerns of auditor gender influence 
on tone being driven by omitted auditor factors, we follow 
Smith (2019) and Velte (2018, 2019) by controlling for audi-
tor characteristics that may alter the level and/or tone of 
the EAR, including going concern opinion (GCO), audit 
fees (AFEES), non-audit service fees (NAFEES), and audit 
partner switch (SWITCH). Finally, industry, year, and audit 
firm fixed effects are included to control for any variation 
related to industry, time and audit firm. Table 2 describes 
all variables.
Different language use between male and female audit 
partners is further examined through testing EAR readabil-
ity. H2b posits that EAR readability varies between males 
and females. To test H2b, Model 4 links the readability of 
the audit report to audit partner gender, number of KAMs, 
and the other auditor and firm-related characteristics.
In Model 4, the dependent variable, READABILITY, 
captures the extent audit reports easily communicate their 
message about the audit process to their intended audience 
(Henry and Leone 2016; Smith and Smith 1971; Smith 
2019). This is measured by the widely used Fog index score, 
which increases with level of difficulty (De Franco et al. 
2015; Smith 2019; Smith and Smith 1971; Velte 2018). The 
Fog index7 formula is as follows:
(4)
READABILITYit = 훽0 + 훽1GENDERit + 훽2KAMit + 훽3RISKit
+ 훽
4
ACCRUALSit + 훽5GCOit + 훽6AC_READABILITYit
+ 훽
7
AFEESit + 훽8NAFEESit + 훽9SWITCHit
+ 훽
10
SIZEit + 훽11ROAit + 훽12QUICKit + 훽13LOSSit
+ 훽
14
DEBTit + 훽15SEGMENTSit
+ Year Fixed Effects+Industry Fixed Effects
+ Audit Firm Fixed Effects + 휀it
Model 4’s main independent variable and control vari-
ables are the same ones utilized in Model 2, apart from 
AC_READABILITY. Following Smith (2019), we employ 
the same control variables in the readability model as in 
the tone model because firm and auditor features that drive 
auditor report tone also drive auditor report complexity and 
readability. Audit committee readability (AC_READABIL-
ITY) is used to capture the impact of audit committee com-
munication with auditors on audit report readability. Con-
sidering that H2b does not predict a certain direction, H2b 
would be empirically supported if the GENDER coefficient 
is significant.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used 
in our econometric models. It shows numerous notable 
results representing widespread distribution of all variables. 
First, KAM ranges from minimum 1 to maximum of 10, with 
a 3.77 mean. Second, LENGTH ranges from minimum 675 
words to maximum of 7421 words, with a 1116 words mean. 
Table 3 indicates that female audit partners audited 10% 
of the sample in an increasing phenomenon. Table 3 also 
indicates that average audit fees is £1.85 million. Third, on 
average 26% of UK firms changed their audit partner over 
the study period. Most of the firms in our sample are profit-
able, with a 12% mean profitability. Finally, Table 3 also 
finds that 16% of the observations are unprofitable.
Furthering our analyses, we divided our sample into two 
sub-samples – firms audited by females (i.e. Gender = 1) and 
males (i.e. Gender = 0). Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 include 
the t test differences in means. The findings largely indicate 
substantial differences between the two sub-samples, as the 
means between the two groups are significantly different as 
follows: KAM (0.10, p < 0.10); LENGTH (0.12, p < 0.05); 
READABILITY (0.36, p < 0.05); TONE (− 0.03, p < 0.05); 
RISK (− 1.24, p < 0.10); AFEES (− 1.10, p < 0.01); SIZE 
(− 0.57, p < 0.01); and SEGMENTS (− 0.50, p < 0.01). 
Essentially, firms audited by female audit partners tend to 
report on average more and detailed KAMs, but also provide 
less readable audit reports in a less optimistic tone. Overall, 
the findings support our predictions.
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations between inde-
pendent and control variables. It shows significant negative 
associations between female audit partners and firm size 
(SIZE) and complexity (SEGMENTS). However, there is a 
significant positive correlation between female audit partner 
and return on assets (ROA). This indicates that female audit 
Fog = 0.4 × (average sentence length + percentage_of_complex_words).
7 We employed El-Haj et al.’s (2019a, b) CFIE-FRSE tool to calcu-
late Fog index score.
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partners are more likely to audit smaller, less complicated, 
and profitable firms. Overall, the correlation matrix does 
not show any potential serious multicollinearity problems.
Regression Results
Tables 5 reports OLS regression results for the four models 
previously explained. A pooled cross-sectional regression 
analysis with industry, year and audit firm fixed effect is 
employed, and White’s t-statistic adjustments are used to 
mitigate heteroscedasticity problems that frequently exist 
in cross-sectional level-based designs. Number of KAMs, 
length of KAMs’ disclosure, EAR tone, and EAR readability 
are the dependent variables in columns 1–6 of Table 5.
Number and Length of KAMs Disclosure Analysis
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show the regression estimates 
for female audit partners (GENDER) and number and length 
of KAMs. The adjusted R2 are 0.36 and 0.56, respectively. 
Results (Column 1) suggest the coefficient of female audit 
partners (0.056) is positive and significant at the p < 0.01 
level, which supports Hypothesis 1a: female audit part-
ners disclose more KAMs than males do, after controlling 
auditee-related risk. With respect to economic significance, 
the number of key audit matters is about 6% higher for firms 
audited by females. Given that the average number of KAMs 
in the sample is about 3.77, our estimates suggest that female 
auditors disclose on average about 3.77 × 1.06 = 4 KAMs. 
Female audit partners thus perceive and report relatively 
more potential risks than male do, supporting the gender 
effect evidence reported in prior audit partner studies (e.g. 
Breesch and Branson 2009; Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019; Har-
dies et al. 2015; Ittonen et al. 2013). While the estimation 
results of number of KAMs deem not economically signifi-
cant, there is a need to consider that the maximum number 
of KAMs is relatively limited. To ensure that auditors do not 
retreat into the boilerplate disclosures, the FRC discouraged 
auditors from disclosing all their significant risks as KAMs, 
after recognizing this case in the first year of mandating 
KAMs (ACCA 2018). Additionally, auditors may present 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics 
and univariate analysis
Variables are defined as follows: audit partner gender (GENDER), number of key audit matters (KAM), 
length of auditor’s disclosure (LENGTH), readability of auditor’s report using Fog (READABILITY-Fog), 
net tone (TONE), number of positive words (POSITIVITY_Freq), number of negative words (NEGATIV-
ITY_Freq), readability of audit committee’s report using Fog (AC_READABILITY), audit committee’s net 
tone (AC_TONE), Firm risk (RISK), audit quality (ACC RUA LS), going concern opinion (GCO), audit fees 
(AFEES), non-audit service fees (NAFEES), auditor Switch (SWITCH), firm size (SIZE), the return on 
assets (ROA), quick asset ratio (QUICK), the presence of a net loss in the current year (LOSS), the ratio of 
debt to total assets (DEBT), and complexity (SEGMENTS)
Variable N Mean SD Min Max Diff in mean t test
GENDER 1373 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 – –
KAM 1373 3.77 1.47 1.00 10.00 0.10* 2.27
LENGTH 1365 1116.05 47.00 675.00 7421.00 0.12** 2.86
READABILITY-Fog 1373 21.10 1.15 18.71 28.13 0.36** 3.31
TONE 1373 − 0.55 0.11 − 0.80 − 0.17 − 0.03** − 3.06
POSITIVITY_Freq 1373 25.26 1.00 16.00 127.00 0.01 1.94
NEGATIVITY_Freq 1373 86.15 6.00 60.00 347.00 − 0.01 − 1.84
AC_READABILITY 1371 21.77 1.55 18.70 27.24 0.03 0.21
AC_TONE 1371 − 0.29 0.18 − 0.77 0.56 − 0.04* − 2.49
RISK 1373 26.91 8.77 10.75 61.49 1.24* 2.40
ACC RUA LS 1373 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.66
GCO 1373 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.42
AFEES (Million) 1373 1.85 4.14 0.03 39.72 − 1.10*** − 9.59
NAFEES % 1373 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.92 − 0.01 − 0.55
SWITCH 1373 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.07 1.88
SIZE 1373 14.06 1.68 9.43 19.51 − 0.57*** − 6.12
ROA 1373 0.12 0.23 − 0.86 3.71 0.07 1.74
QUICK 1373 1.22 1.27 0.09 28.64 − 0.05 − 0.75
LOSS 1373 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.05 1.55
DEBT 1373 0.22 0.17 0.00 1.10 − 0.01 − 0.50
SEGMENTS 1373 2.57 2.03 1.00 10.00 − 0.50*** − 3.95
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KAMs in an aggregated format that may affect the number 
of KAMs.
Column 2 of Table 5 presents Model (2)’s findings on 
whether female audit partners (GENDER) disclose more 
detailed KAMs (LENGTH). It shows the coefficient of 
Table 5  The impact of audit 
partner gender on the extended 
audit reporting
The above table represents regression coefficients and t statistics in parentheses
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable
Dependent variable H1a H1b H2a H2a H2b H2b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KAMs Length Tone Tone Readability Readability
GENDER 0.056*** 0.127*** − 0.031*** − 0.030*** 0.214** 0.228**
(2.63) (4.08) (− 3.27) (− 3.12) (2.15) (2.26)
KAM 0.214*** − 0.000 − 0.003 0.015 0.011
(20.90) (− 0.15) (− 1.22) (0.62) (0.45)
AC_TONE 0.077*** 0.070***
(4.38) (3.97)
AC_READABILITY 0.121*** 0.122***
(5.50) (5.51)
RISK 0.002* 0.005*** − 0.000 − 0.000 0.003 0.004
(1.90) (3.12) (− 0.89) (− 0.44) (0.88) (1.03)
ACC RUA LS 0.071 0.661** 0.124** 0.126** − 0.059 − 0.131
(0.53) (2.54) (2.03) (2.12) (− 0.13) (− 0.28)
GCO 0.025 0.036 − 0.062*** 0.097
(0.55) (0.39) (− 3.94) (0.43)
AFEES 0.066*** 0.028** 0.014*** 0.053*
(8.78) (2.43) (4.29) (1.85)
NAFEES − 0.016 0.032 − 0.009 0.233
(− 0.43) (0.53) (− 0.61) (1.47)
SWITCH − 0.023 0.020 0.001 0.005
(− 1.47) (0.86) (0.18) (0.08)
SIZE 0.184*** 0.124*** 0.002 0.003 0.042* 0.102*
(13.74) (5.49) (0.91) (0.42) (1.77) (1.68)
ROA − 0.120*** − 0.040 − 0.015 − 0.022* 0.048 0.036
(− 4.65) (− 0.82) (− 1.33) (− 1.94) (0.56) (0.42)
QUICK 0.011 0.015 − 0.006 − 0.006 0.067*** 0.063***
(1.64) (1.46) (− 1.54) (− 1.55) (3.79) (3.43)
LOSS 0.061*** 0.089*** − 0.016* − 0.017** − 0.042 − 0.055
(3.02) (2.83) (− 1.91) (− 2.07) (− 0.52) (− 0.68)
DEBT 0.024 − 0.001 − 0.025 − 0.024 0.085 0.066
(0.54) (− 0.02) (− 1.36) (− 1.31) (0.48) (0.36)
SEGMENTS 0.005 0.013** 0.001 0.001 0.028** 0.029**
(1.47) (2.18) (0.77) (0.69) (1.97) (2.00)
CONSTANT 1.423*** 4.941*** − 0.631*** − 0.592*** 18.009*** 18.434***
(23.20) (31.79) (− 14.98) (− 25.72) (32.69) (34.28)
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Audit firm fixed 
effects
Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 1373 1365 1373 1373 1373 1373
Max VIF 1.63 1.91 1.83 1.85 1.90 1.92
F stat 31.76 55.87 9.48 10.46 17.36 15.70
p value  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001  < .001
Adjusted  R2 36% 56% 12% 14% 21% 22%
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females as significantly positive (0.127) at the p < 0.01 
level, indicating that female audit partners provide more 
details about KAMs than males do. With regard to eco-
nomic significance, our evidence is significant because it 
implies that the length of the disclosed KAMs is 12.7% 
higher for firms audited by a female audit partner. Given 
that the average length of KAMs in the sample is about 
1116, our estimates suggest that female auditors disclose 
about 1116 × 1.127 = 1258 words as average length of the 
disclosed KAMs. Noticeably, this quantity is economically 
and statistically significant, given the limited number of 
EAR pages. This result strongly supports Hypothesis 1b and 
is consistent with the idea of female audit partners being 
risk-averse. Females’ lengthy KAMs disclosures signal their 
effort expended in the audit process to provide higher audit 
quality and minimize their legal liability exposure (Doxey 
2014; Twedt and Rees 2012). This is consistent with previ-
ous evidence provided for female audit partners overestimat-
ing their responsibilities, exerting more effort, and assigning 
more resources to audit tasks (Chung and Monroe 2001; 
Ittonen et al. 2013; Ittonen and Peni 2012; O’Donnell and 
Johnson 2001). It also matches predictions for gender-based 
variances in risk aversion having significant implications for 
the audit process and, consequently, auditor disclosures and 
audit quality.
These findings contribute to extant research on gender 
diversity and current debates concerning female audit part-
ners’ auditing role. In this sense, recent auditing and finan-
cial reporting quality literature has emphasized that gender 
diversity can influence information asymmetries, going con-
cern opinions, earnings management, and quality of audit 
services (Abbott et al. 2012; Cameran et al. 2018; Elamer 
et al. 2020a, b; Fondas and Sassalos 2000; Garcia-Blandon 
et al. 2019; Hardies et al. 2016; Ittonen et al. 2013).
The Tone and Readability of Auditor’s Report Analysis
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 present the regression findings 
for female audit partners (GENDER) and audit report tone. 
Optimistic (positiveness) tone is used to proxy for EAR tone. 
The adjusted R2 for the models is 0.12 and 0.14, respectively. 
Column 3 of Table 5 presents the basic line regression model 
(that only controls for client-related characteristics) and 
shows a significant negative relationship between GENDER 
and EAR tone at 1%, which associates females with a less 
optimistic tone. Hence, hypothesis H2a is accepted. We also 
extend this model by adding other auditor-related controls 
in Column 4 of Table 5. Results remain unchanged under 
these alternative specifications.8 The economic significance 
of this evidence is that the optimistic tone of the EAR is 3% 
lower for firms audited by a female. Given that the average 
optimistic tone of the EAR in the sample is about − 0.55, 
our estimates suggest that female auditors use less optimistic 
tone in the EAR by about − 0.55 × 3% = 0.02. Consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Burke et al. 2019; Palvia et al. 2015), 
the use of less optimistic language by female audit partners 
can be justified in view of their risk-averse attitude to reduce 
their legal liability exposure.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table  5 present our results for 
Hypotheses 2b, which predicted that the EAR readability 
level would vary between male and female audit partners. 
The adjusted R2 are 0.21 and 0.22, respectively. Column 5 
presents the basic line regression model (that only controls 
for client-related characteristics) and shows a significant 
positive association between female audit partners (GEN-
DER) and EAR readability at 5%, indicating that females 
tend to produce less readable reports. We also extend this 
model by adding other auditor-related controls in Column 
6 of Table 5. The results remain robust under these alterna-
tive specifications and strongly support Hypothesis 2b. The 
economic implication of this evidence is that the readability 
of the EAR is 22.8% lower for firms audited by a female. 
Given that the average readability of the EAR in the sample 
is about 21.10, our estimates suggest that female auditors 
EAR readability about 21.10 × 1.228 = 25.91. Evidently, this 
extent is economically significant, plus its statistical signif-
icance. This finding is generally against Kim and Chung 
(2014) and Ginesti et al. (2018), who document positive 
links between women’s participation in general and finan-
cial reporting readability. A potential explanation could be 
that female audit partners provide lengthy KAMs disclosure9 
that are too detailed and long for readers to process easily, 
hence negatively affect the readability of the audit report 
(Bonsall and Miller 2017; Loughran and McDonald 2014; 
You and Zhang 2009). Additionally, the assurance role of 
female auditors and the language complexity can explain 
the less readable audit report. This is consistent with Carver 
and Trinkle (2017), who report KAMs’ negative impact on 
report readability.
Overall, the findings of this study support the behavioural 
economics and cognitive psychology research that proposes 
significant gender-based variances in risk tolerance (e.g. 
Abbott et al. 2012; Ittonen et al. 2013; Nettle 2007; Pierce 
and Sweeney 2010; Schmitt et al. 2008). Our results propose 
that behavioural variances between men and women may 
8 As a robustness check, we control for audit report length in Model 
3. Our results (untabulated) remain qualitatively unchanged under 
these alternative specifications.
9 Disclosing more information about perceived risks (i.e. auditor 
assessment of client risk in the KAMs section) involves technical 
information and expressions that could increase the difficulty of audit 
report readability.
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have significant implications for audit partners’ perception 
of risk and their writing style. Recent research (e.g. Ben-
Amar et al. 2017; Bravo and Alcaide-Ruiz 2019; Elamer 
et al. 2019, 2020a, b; Elmagrhi et al. 2019; Garcia-Blandon 
et al. 2019; Knechel et al. 2015; Sierra-Garcia et al. 2019) 
has emphasized that personal attributes such as gender diver-
sity can have a significant consequence on the audit qual-
ity and financial reporting. In this respect, our results add 
to this stream of research as we documented that auditor 
gender plays a significant role in driving audit reporting, 
thus helping academics, regulators and policymakers better 
evaluate the audit reporting style of audit partners. They 
also contribute to the current political debate about females’ 
underrepresentation at senior levels of the audit and account-
ing profession.
Finally, regarding control variables, we found RISK, 
AFEES, SIZE, QUICK, LOSS, and DEBT statistically sig-
nificant and positively related to the number, length, tone, 
and readability of disclosed KAMs, implying that UK firms 
with high levels of these variables more likely get greater 
KAMs detail.
Additional Analyses
We employ a battery of additional tests to ascertain the 
robustness of our results. First, under the main analysis, on 
whether female audit partners more likely disclose more 
KAMs, our analysis suggests, so far, that this is so. Fur-
thermore, we assert that having a female audit partner rein-
forces the RISK–KAM association, based on the assump-
tion that female audit partners disclose KAMs that properly 
capture firm risk. To empirically test this, we include the 
GENDER × RISK, a variable created by interacting auditor 
gender (GENDER) and firm risk (RISK). The coefficient of 
interest, β3, presents the incremental effect of GENDER on 
the relationship between firm risk (RISK) and the current 
number of KAMs (KAM). A positive coefficient β3 shows a 
higher relationship between RISK and KAM for firms audited 
by a female partner, and vice versa. We use Model 5 to test 
this assumption as follows.
Column 1 of Table  6 gives the estimation results. The 
coefficient β3 is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level, offering empirical evidence for the higher num-
ber of KAMs in female-audited firms strongly relating to 
(5)
KAMit = 훽0 + 훽1GENDERit + 훽2RISKit + 훽3GENDER × RISKit
+ 훽4ACCRUALSit + 훽5GCOit + 훽6AFEESit + 훽7NAFEESit
+ 훽8SWITCHit + 훽9SIZEit + 훽10ROAit + 훽11QUICKit
+ 훽12LOSSit + 훽13DEBTit + 훽14SEGMENTSit
+ Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects
+ Audit Firm Fixed Effects + 휀it
a firm’s risk. This finding supports Hypothesis 1a that the 
RISK–KAM connection is significantly and positively con-
tingent on GENDER, implying that female audit partners 
are more risk-averse and sensitive to litigation risk. Specifi-
cally, the female audit partners report captures more of the 
firm’s risk.
Second, our findings thus far show that female auditors 
influence the extent of KAM reporting, likely disclosing 
more KAM details than males do. Alternatively, though, this 
could indicate a different style, with some auditors writing 
more but shorter KAMs. To address this possibility, we cal-
culate LENGTH as the natural log of the average length of an 
individual KAM rather than total KAMs length. The results 
(column 2 of Table 6) confirm the positive relationship 
between female audit partners and KAMs disclosure level 
(p < 0.01). This implies that females disclose more details 
to accommodate and explain their perceived risk, and it sup-
ports the notion of female audit partners being more risk-
averse and sensitive to litigation risk; hence they are highly 
motivated to signal their effort and provide detailed KAMs 
disclosure. Remarkably, Column 2 of Table 6 reports the 
coefficient of KAM as significantly negative (− 0.057) at the 
p < 0.01 level, suggesting that, on average, increased KAM 
numbers decrease the average length of an individual KAM.
Third, while the main analysis indicates a less optimistic 
tone in female audit partners’ reports, results do not evidence 
their use of the positive or/and negative tone separately. To 
investigate these tones separately, we split the tone into two 
groups: negative and positive. Following Smith (2019), posi-
tive tone (Positive_words) uses the following formula:
Similarly, calculating negative tone (Negative_words) 
involves this formula:
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 report the adjusted R2 as 0.12 
and 0.16, respectively. Column 5 of Table 6 shows a signifi-
cant positive (negative) relationship between female auditors 
and the use of negative (positive) tone. Hence, we accept 
hypothesis H2a about female audit partners using a less opti-
mistic tone. These findings suggest that female audit partners 
are using more negative words/tone in their EAR.
Fourth, we next test the robustness of the audit report 
readability using the measure of the Flesch-Kincaid Reading 
Ease Score (Kincaid et al. 1975) as an alternate proxy for 
readability, which is calculated as follows:
(6)Positive_wordsit =
No. of positive words
Total audit report words
(7)Negative_wordsit =
No. of negative words
Total audit report words
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Table 6  Additional analysis
The above table represents regression coefficients and t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable
Dependent variables H1a H1b H2a H2a H2b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
KAMs Average length Positive words Negative words Readability 
(Flesch)
GENDER − 0.001 0.111*** − 0.000* 0.001*** − 0.622*
(− 0.09) (3.70) (− 1.92) (2.66) (− 1.85)
RISK 0.022* 0.004*** 0.000 0.000** 0.011
(1.70) (2.73) (0.55) (2.45) (0.78)
GENDER × RISK 0.023**
(2.34)
KAM − 0.057*** − 0.000 0.000*** − 0.312***
(− 5.29) (− 0.15) (2.76) (− 3.08)
AC_TONE 0.081*** 0.084***
(4.22) (3.83)
AC_READABILITY 0.159***
(5.12)
ACC RUA LS 0.074 0.587** 0.000 − 0.007*** 0.477
(0.55) (2.27) (0.30) (− 2.99) (0.29)
GCO 0.026 0.005 − 0.000 0.004*** 0.096
(0.58) (0.05) (− 1.45) (5.21) (0.08)
AFEES 0.066*** 0.028** 0.000*** − 0.000 − 0.425***
(8.77) (2.43) (4.20) (− 0.20) (− 3.81)
NAFEES − 0.017 0.073 − 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.612
(− 0.46) (1.22) (− 1.06) (− 1.19) (− 1.14)
SWITCH − 0.023 0.030 − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.034
(− 1.48) (1.32) (− 0.38) (− 1.24) (− 0.15)
SIZE 0.184*** 0.127*** − 0.000 − 0.000 − 0.932***
(13.71) (5.77) (− 0.18) (− 0.72) (− 3.65)
ROA − 0.120*** 0.037 − 0.001*** − 0.001 0.103
(− 4.66) (0.69) (− 4.11) (− 0.97) (0.37)
QUICK 0.011 0.010 − 0.000 0.000** − 0.185***
(1.64) (1.10) (− 0.79) (2.08) (− 3.21)
LOSS 0.060*** 0.108*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.237
(2.96) (3.45) (0.15) (4.18) (0.79)
DEBT 0.023 − 0.070 0.000 0.003*** − 0.407
(0.52) (− 1.02) (0.77) (3.75) (− 0.57)
SEGMENTS 0.005 0.015*** 0.000** 0.000* − 0.115**
(1.44) (2.60) (2.32) (1.69) (− 2.16)
CONSTANT 1.493*** 4.735*** 0.005*** 0.024*** 38.508***
(27.14) (32.80) (10.65) (22.99) (22.80)
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included
Audit firm fixed 
effects
Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 1373 1365 1373 1373 1373
Max VIF 1.63 1.91 1.84 1.88 1.99
F stat 30.58 23.29 8.55 11.49 19.01
p value  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001
Adjusted R2 36% 40% 12% 16% 25%
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For this, a higher score indicates easier reading. Column 5 
of Table 6 presents these results and shows the coefficient 
of female auditor (GENDER) as negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level (β = − 0.622). This generally 
confirms the results presented in Column 4 of Table 5 that 
showed a negative association between female auditors and 
report readability. The coefficients on the control variables in 
Column 5 of Table 6 generally parallel those in Column 4 in 
the main analysis of Table 5, implying that our conclusions 
were unchanged regardless of specification.
Lastly, all the dependent variables in the previous models 
are considered as indicator variables – 1 if above the median, 
and 0 otherwise. Then, we conducted logistic regression mod-
els by replicating our results in Tables 5 and 6 using different 
variable specifications. The (untabulated) findings indicate 
that results reported in Tables 5 and 6 are not affected.10
Endogeneity
Although evidence so far suggests female audit partners 
more likely disclose more and greater detailed KAMs, pro-
vide less readable reports, and adopt less optimistic tones, 
dangers lurk in possible endogeneity bias from issues such 
as omitted variables, and self-selection bias.11 For instance, 
some female audit partners’ appointments may not be ran-
dom and self-select into certain types of firms (Lennox and 
Wu 2018), which may invite self-selection bias. Hardies 
et al. (2016) find that riskier auditees tend to be assigned 
to female audit partners. As presented in Table 3, several 
observable firm-related characteristics (e.g. RISK, SIZE, 
SEGMENTS) differ between female-audited and male-
audited clients. Furthermore, some omitted time-variant and 
time-invariant variables12 may affect results and the selection 
(8)Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease score = 0.39 Number of words
Number of sentences
+ 11.8
Number of syllables
Number of words
− 15.59
of female audit partners. To address potential endogenei-
ties, we employ a serial of alternative ways in this section, 
including the use of matched sample based on propensity 
score matching (PSM) procedure, the instrumental variable 
approach using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, 
and quasi-experimental differences-in-differences (DID) 
methodology around audit partner switch.
Propensity Score Matching (PSM)
One source of possible endogeneity here is selection bias. 
Companies audited by female partners could differ much 
from those audited by males. Univariate findings in Table 3 
suggest a self-selection issue because such aforementioned 
companies may vary in several company-specific features. 
The significant t test results (Table 3) for RISK, SIZE, and 
SEGMENT between male and female-audited clients support 
the idea that different types of clients are in fact audited by 
male and female audit partners, with females generally audit 
smaller, less complicated, and riskier firms (Garcia-Blandon 
et al. 2019; Hardies et al. 2015). To test whether the gender 
influence noticed in this study so far is driven by the dif-
ferent types of companies that men and women generally 
audit, we re-estimate the study models using a PSM sam-
ple (Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019; Hardies et al. 2015, 2016; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
We start with the following Probit regression model to 
estimate the likelihood of hiring female audit partners. Then, 
we match, with replacement, each female-audited client with 
a male-audited client that has the nearest propensity scores 
generated from the estimated Probit model (Dehejia and 
Wahba 2002).13 We classify matched pairs with the lowest 
propensity score difference (i.e. 1%), resulting in a matched 
sample of 172 firm-year observations.
13 Dehejia and Wahba (2002) show that PSM with replacement 
brings better results than PSM without replacement.
10 As a robustness check, we rerun a pooled cross-sectional regres-
sion analysis with industry, year, and auditor fixed effect employed 
and standard errors clustered by firm as an alternative method. Our 
unreported results remain qualitatively unchanged under this alterna-
tive specification. We also winsorized all continuous variables at the 
1st and 99th percentiles to address possible outliers. The untabulated 
results suggest this did not significantly influence our main findings.
11 We are grateful to three anonymous reviewers for suggesting this 
line of investigation.
12 We also employed firm fixed effects analysis to mitigate unob-
servable time-invariant factors. Although, our results hold the same 
direction, we did not get the expected significance for Hypothesis 1. 
A plausible reason is that the percentage of treatment observations in 
our sample is relatively low (i.e. only 137 firm-year observations have 
female audit partners) and sticky across years, thus firm fixed effects 
specification may lack the power to detect significant results. Zhou 
(2001) argues that the lack of within-firm variation in the independent 
variable (especially when it is a dummy variable) works against find-
ing a significant relationship with the dependent one. Hence, the use 
of a firm fixed effect model may bias the results and makes it difficult 
to find a meaningful relationship even if one existed. This is also sup-
ported by Chen et al. (2018) and Kim et al. (2011). We acknowledge 
this as a limitation of the study.
Fwootnote 12 (continued)
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where the matched pairs selection model includes GENDER 
as the dependent variable. Model 9 includes all Model 1′s 
firm-related control variables, as well as other variables 
that help to explain auditor selection. Following Lobo et al. 
(2017), we added two more variables: FSALES, defined as 
total foreign sales as a percentage of total client sales, while 
MTB denotes market to book ratio. Hardies et al. (2015) 
indicate that audit committees with a significant number 
of female members may strongly prefer selecting a female 
auditor. Therefore, we added FEMALE_AC to capture the 
percentage of female audit committee members within each 
firm.
Then, we check whether the matched sample effectively 
controls for the diverse types of auditee of male and female 
audit partners. The t test results for the matched sample (unt-
abulated) show insignificant differences between male and 
female audit partners in all client-related variables, support-
ing the reliability of our matching.
Next, we employ the matched sample of 172 observa-
tions and re-estimate all models of Table 5. Table 7’s results 
show female audit partners’ coefficients as significantly 
and positively associated with KAMs numbers and extent 
of disclosure in columns 1 and 2 (p < 0.01, and p < 0.10, 
respectively). Moreover, Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show 
female audit partners’ coefficients as significantly associated 
with less optimistic audit report tone and readability (both at 
p < 0.05). Thus, estimates of the matched sample reinforce 
our main findings and show that results in Table 5 were not 
driven by differences in clients’ characteristics.
Two‑stage Least Square (2SLS)14
Hardies et al. (2015, 2016) argue that PSM fails to con-
trol for unobservable characteristics that could derive both 
dependent and independent variables and assumes potential 
biases to be insignificant. Therefore, it is possible that both 
auditors’ disclosure and the selection of female auditors 
are significantly affected by some unobservable factors. To 
(9)
Pr
[
GENDERit = 1
]
= 훽
0
+ 훽
1
RISKit + 훽2FSALESit + 훽3MTBit
+ 훽
4
SIZEit + 훽5ROAit + 훽6QUICKit + 훽7LOSSit
+ 훽
8
DEBTit + 훽9SEGMENTSit + 훽10FEMALE_ACit
+ Year Fixed Effects + Industry Fixed Effects
+ Audit Firm Fixed Effects + 휀it ,
Table 7  PSM estimation results for the impact of audit partner gender 
on the extended audit reporting
The above table represents regression coefficients and t statistics in 
parentheses
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for the definitions of 
each variable
PSM matching H1a H1b H2a H2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KAMs Length Tone Readability
Dependent variables
GENDER 0.138*** 0.116* − 0.038** 0.415**
(3.19) (1.67) (− 2.28) (2.03)
KAM 0.161*** − 0.009 − 0.158*
(4.09) (− 1.20) (− 1.78)
AC_TONE 0.031
(0.54)
AC_READABIL-
ITY
0.208***
(3.18)
RISK 0.001 0.011* 0.001 − 0.014
(0.41) (1.80) (1.09) (− 1.09)
ACC RUA LS 0.271 0.225 − 0.105 − 0.526
(0.53) (0.32) (− 0.50) (− 0.21)
GCO 0.021 0.018 − 0.007 − 0.611
(0.15) (0.08) (− 0.11) (− 1.64)
AFEES 0.071*** 0.065** 0.035*** − 0.007
(3.32) (2.03) (3.83) (− 0.08)
NAFEES − 0.000 0.117 0.114** 0.527
(− 0.00) (0.70) (2.21) (0.95)
SWITCH − 0.015 − 0.016 − 0.022 − 0.033
(− 0.31) (− 0.24) (− 1.22) (− 0.16)
SIZE 0.206*** 0.251*** 0.043** − 0.028
(3.88) (2.65) (2.23) (− 0.11)
ROA − 0.340 − 0.280 − 0.111 − 0.359
(− 1.20) (− 0.68) (− 1.19) (− 0.41)
Quick − 0.023 0.018 0.001 0.116
(− 1.00) (0.45) (0.12) (1.20)
LOSS 0.076 0.066 − 0.014 0.330
(1.09) (0.61) (− 0.45) (1.11)
DEBT 0.300** − 0.174 − 0.067 0.300
(2.24) (− 0.81) (− 1.20) (0.49)
SEGMENTS − 0.034*** 0.022 0.006 0.071
(− 2.84) (0.87) (1.23) (1.02)
CONSTANT 1.588*** 5.047*** − 0.723*** 17.495***
(7.28) (7.72) (− 10.90) (10.67)
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included
Industry fixed 
effects
Included Included Included Included
Audit firm fixed 
effects
Included Included Included Included
Observations 172 172 172 172
F stat 7.68 8.38 5.19 2.27
p value  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001
Adjusted R2 38% 53% 20% 11%14 We thank anonymous reviewers for suggesting the use of 
two-stage instrumental variable regressions. As a robustness check, 
we employ the Heckman two-step procedure as an alternative method 
(Heckman 1979). Our results (untabulated) remain qualitatively 
unchanged under these alternative specifications.
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address this concern, we employ the two-stage Least Square 
(2SLS) instrumental variable approach.
In the first stage, we construct a Probit regression with 
GENDER as the dependent variable (Hardies et al. 2015, 
2016) among diverse observable variables (i.e. all con-
trol variables in our main regression). As the 2SLS model 
requires an additional exogenous variable, we employ the 
percentage of females on an audit committee (FEMALE_AC) 
as an instrumental variable for two main reasons. First, it 
is associated with auditor gender (GENDER), our variable 
of interest.15 Hardies et al. (2015) indicate that audit com-
mittees with a significant number of female members may 
strongly prefer selecting a female auditor. Lee et al. (2019) 
also find female representation on the clients’ board of direc-
tors increases the likelihood of having female auditors. Sec-
ond, it is unlikely that the percentage of females on the audit 
committee to affect auditor disclosure, except through the 
incidence of female audit partners (Lee et al. 2019).
Following Lee et al. (2019), we test the validity of 
our instrumental variable. We estimate regressions of 
FEMALE_AC against female audit partners and get 
the residuals. Then, we used the residuals in our main 
models. The coefficient on the residual FEMALE_AC 
is insignificant in all of our models, suggesting that 
FEMALE_AC affects our dependent variables only 
through our main variable of interest, female audit part-
ners. Therefore, our instrumental variable satisfies the 
exclusion criteria. The 2SLS model is therefore likely 
not to suffer from weak instrument problems. Though 
our additional array of checks reinforces our instrumen-
tal variable validity, we admit that determining reason-
able instruments is puzzling and that their quality may 
be imperfect (Lee et al. 2019).
In the second stage, we use the fitted values of GEN-
DER from the first stage as our main independent vari-
able and then estimate the main regression models (1–4). 
Results from the second stage of the 2SLS are reported 
in Columns (1–4) of Table 8. The results from the 2SLS 
procedure are highly similar to those reported in Table 5 
and suggest that GENDER has a significant impact on the 
extent of KAMs disclosure and auditors’ writing (com-
munication) style.
Difference‑in‑Difference (DID)
As discussed earlier, the relationship between female 
audit partners and the extent of auditor disclosure and the 
Table 8  2SLS estimation results for the impact of audit partner gen-
der on the extended audit reporting
The above table represents regression coefficients and t statistics in 
parentheses
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. See Table 2 for the definitions of 
each variable
IV 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
KAMs Length Tone Readability
Dependent variables
 GENDER 0.379* 1.395** − 0.510*** 4.816***
(1.91) (2.35) (− 2.86) (5.77)
 KAM 0.175*** 0.007 − 0.064
(9.01) (1.10) (− 1.42)
 AC_TONE − 0.001
(− 0.02)
 AC_READABIL-
ITY
0.080**
(2.27)
 RISK − 0.001 0.003 − 0.000 0.015*
(− 0.39) (0.87) (− 0.14) (1.87)
 ACC RUA LS 0.151 1.580*** 0.025 0.478
(0.69) (3.02) (0.18) (0.37)
 GCO − 0.068 0.088 − 0.025 − 0.619
(− 1.38) (0.60) (− 0.39) (− 1.22)
 AFEES 0.054*** 0.039 0.012 0.046
(3.87) (1.49) (1.24) (0.77)
 NAFEES 0.096* − 0.281** − 0.028 0.315
(1.66) (− 2.32) (− 0.69) (1.06)
 SWITCH − 0.025* − 0.018 0.002 − 0.017
(− 1.65) (− 0.49) (0.18) (− 0.14)
 SIZE 0.197*** 0.190*** − 0.031* 0.335***
(6.89) (3.75) (− 1.86) (2.92)
 ROA − 0.098 − 0.583 − 0.223 0.780
(− 0.46) (− 1.45) (− 1.39) (0.82)
 QUICK − 0.021 − 0.019 0.002 − 0.047
(− 0.68) (− 0.28) (0.09) (− 0.36)
 LOSS 0.049 0.019 − 0.018 − 0.226
(1.53) (0.26) (− 0.83) (− 1.29)
 DEBT 0.057 − 0.145 0.046 − 0.358
(0.64) (− 0.94) (0.74) (− 0.92)
 SEGMENTS 0.014* 0.032** − 0.011** 0.121***
(1.85) (2.00) (− 2.52) (3.70)
 CONSTANT 1.241*** 5.589*** − 0.547*** 18.407***
(14.06) (16.25) (− 6.60) (20.26)
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included
Industry fixed 
effects
Included Included Included Included
Audit firm fixed 
effects
Included Included Included Included
Observations 1070 1063 1070 1070
15 In the 1st stage, the relationship between female audit partner 
(GENDER) and the percentage of female presence in audit commit-
tee (FEMALE_AC) is significant positive (at 5%) across Models 1–4, 
with a related coefficients of 0.86, 0.76, 0.77, and 0.82, respectively.
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communication style regarding KAMs may be affected by 
unobservable omitted variable bias. To supplementary miti-
gate these concerns, we adopt a quasi-experimental differ-
ences-in-differences (DID) methodology. We follow Garcia-
Blandon et al. (2019), Hardies et al. (2015) and Ittonen et al. 
(2013) and test the abovementioned relationship by inves-
tigating whether the noted KAMs disclosure and reporting 
style change after a female audit partner’s appointment. 
The DID analysis compares these before and after switches 
from a male-to-female audit partner with a control sample of 
male-to-male switches. We generate a dummy variable MTF, 
which equals 1 for a male-to-female audit partner switch 
and 0 for a male to a male one. This results in a sample that 
includes 193 male-to-male and 25 male-to-female partner 
switches, giving a final sample of 218 firm-year observa-
tions. Hence, MTF represents the incremental variation 
because of switching from a male to a female audit partner. 
Following Hardies et al. (2015), we re-estimate the regres-
sion models in Table 5 with MTF acts as the main inde-
pendent variable, while the dependent and control variables 
are measured by the change (Δ) from year t − 1 to year t, 
utilizing each auditee as its own control. The estimated coef-
ficients for MTF (0.089, − 0.048, and 0.510, respectively) 
are statistically significant at 10% for Models 1, 3, and 4, 
respectively. In contrast, while the MTF coefficient in Model 
2 (0.026) has the expected sign, it is not statistically signifi-
cant. These findings suggest that females disclose a higher 
number of KAMs, use less optimistic tone, and provide less 
readable disclosures following an audit partner switch, than 
males do. Though, given the few number of audit partner 
switches in our sample, causal interpretations of DID results 
should be made with caution since they are restricted by a 
lack of statistical power (Ittonen et al. 2013).
Conclusion
Although the effects of female audit partners on risk, auditor 
judgements, and audit quality have been fairly documented, 
the literature is silent on how auditor gender influences audit 
reporting. Thus, this study contributes to the extant literature 
by examining: (i) association between auditor gender and 
KAMs (numbers and details); and (ii) consequently, ascer-
taining whether auditor gender influences audit reporting 
style (tone and readability).
Based on a 2013–2017 sample of UK firms, the results 
suggest that female audit partners more likely disclose more 
KAMs (i.e. number and detail) than their male counterparts, 
after controlling for client and auditor attributes. The find-
ings also suggest that female audit partners tend to provide 
less readable reports in a less optimistic tone. Our evidence 
tallies with the predictions that gender-based variances in 
cognitive information processing, litigation risk, and risk 
aversion may have significant implications for audit qual-
ity and EAR. This resembles empirical and experimental 
research on female audit partners providing higher audit 
quality (Garcia-Blandon et al. 2019; Ginesti et al. 2018; 
Hardies et al. 2016; Ittonen et al. 2013). Our results sup-
port the notion that female audit partners in the UK make 
different decisions regarding disclosing more quantity and 
greater detail about KAMs, doing so in different writing 
styles. These results are generally robust to alternative meas-
ures/models, self-selection bias and several endogeneities.
This study makes several new contributions to the current 
literature. First, it offers first-time evidence on the effect of 
auditor gender on KAMs in EARs. Specifically, it shows 
that hiring female auditors likely increases the number of 
and detail on KAMs, which will interest investors and regu-
lators who are seeking ways to improve auditor reporting. 
Second, it evidences the impact of auditor gender on the 
tone and readability of audit reports, adding much to related 
literature. Finally, it shows how auditor gender significantly 
drives audit reporting, thus helping academics, regulators, 
and policymakers both better evaluate the audit reporting 
style of female audit partners and subsequently develop 
research, regulations, and policy-making.
Our results show women’s underrepresentation in audit 
firms’ top ranks. Thus, it supports different ideas in several 
countries worldwide to encourage gender diversity. These 
findings offer policymakers further incentive to pursue gen-
der diversity reforms. Specifically, we hope that our results 
will enlighten regulators and policymakers with robust 
evidence in favour of improving the female auditor’s rep-
resentation. Distinctively, our findings can help regulators 
and policymakers through their revelations that behavioural 
variances between men and women auditors significantly 
influence EAR content, writing style, and disclosure levels. 
Our results also could help shareholders and other stakehold-
ers recognize the importance of having female audit partners 
because they tend to report KAMs more closely with stake-
holders’ expectations.
Our findings also have a significant practical implica-
tion for audit firms by revealing the impact of female audit 
partners on recent audit reporting reforms. While the exist-
ing literature indicates that it is preferred to appoint female 
auditors, our results imply that female auditors indeed tend 
to report more quantity and greater detail about KAMs. We 
hope that our results will enlighten audit firms to offer more 
nuanced attention to female auditors with the aim of address 
the gender‐based risk aversion. This study also implies that 
audit committees may choose female audit partners as a 
strategic business decision to consider gender‐based risk 
preferences.
Though our study employs rigorous methods to examine 
the relationship between auditor gender and EAR, it also 
has several caveats that need acknowledging. First, data and 
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regulations constraints limited this study to non-financial 
UK companies listed in FTSE ALL Shares index, so the 
results might not be pertinent to smaller firms. Future studies 
should try to investigate the EARs published by firms with 
different capitalizations. Second, we use a UK sample only. 
Future studies could examine whether specific country-level 
variables influence the impact of auditor gender on audi-
tor disclosure, considering factors such as religion, culture, 
governance, and macro-social level dimensions. Future stud-
ies should try to expand across different legal and cultural 
systems to help global investors interpret auditor reports. 
Thirdly, subsequent studies can consider other organiza-
tional attributes that may influence KAMs, such as particu-
lar corporate governance mechanisms. Future research also 
could study male and female audit partners to obtain a rich 
understanding of how auditors’ experience and attributes 
specifically influence the matters concerned herein. Finally, 
we used a particular software (i.e. CFIE-FRSE) to calculate 
auditor disclosure tone and readability. Automated textual 
analyses are an emergent strand in accounting research, so 
the consistent classifications are not clear to some extent. 
Though the fuzziness of textual analysis is not obstructing 
its use, nonetheless it is an attribute that may be provoked 
in constructing future empirical findings that are anticipated 
to have reliable influence and can be rationally reproduced 
(Loughran and McDonald 2016; Melloni et al. 2017). Future 
research may develop new, modified measures of auditor 
reporting characteristics based on manual content analysis 
or/and by employing our analyses with textual analysis tools 
other than CFIE-FRSE (e.g. DICTION).
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